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Preface
The food problem is to a large extent a local one; in the
long run countries must generate sufficient purchasing power in
all income classes to avoid·malnutrition. It is, however, also
a problem of global interaction, when developed countries attempt
to alleviate malnutrition through food aid. It is even more a
global concern when economic development is expedited in less
developed countries through trade agreements and credit arrange-
ments.
The interactions among nations through trade will be
investigated in the international model. An analysis will be
conducted of how the national policies of various countries
influence other countries.
The development of an international model requires a
methodological research concerned with the linkage of national
models for food and agriculture. This memorandum is the first
of a series on this topic.
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Abstract
Part I of this paper deals with methodological questions
connected with the linking of national into a model of world
trade.
Part II discusses an application with special emphasis
on agricultural policies. The national model which is
developed is essentially an extension of the model for a
market economy in MOIRA: instead of one commodity more
commodities are considered and instead of only policies
aiming at a certain domestic price, policies which directly
limit the trade balance of certain commodities are now also
taken into consideration. I
-v-
RM-77-2
LINKING NATIONAL MODELS OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE:
An Introduction
M.A. Keyzer
January 1977
Research Memoranda are interim reports on research being con-
ducted by the International Institt;te for Applied Systems Analysis,
and as such receive only limited scientifk review. Views or opin-
ions contained herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute or of the National Member Organizations supporting the
Institute.
Part I
1.
1.1
1 .2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.
2. 1
2.2
2.3
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
7 . 1
7.2
8.
Part II
1-
2.
3.
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.
4. 1
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2
LINKING NATIONAL MODELS OF FOOD AND AGR!CULTURE:
\
An Introduction
General Introducti0n
Introduction
International interactions and the "Food and Agri-
culture" project at IIASA
Pure trade models
Econometric trade models
Formal linking
Non-formal linking
Loose linking
Some notions of equilibrium
Equilibrium condition
Market equilibrium
Competitive equilibrium
Models of general equilibrium
Linking in a model of competitive general equilibrium
The formal linking of black-boxes
External requirements for national models
Some internal requirements for the black-boxes
Existence of equilibrium between black-boxes
Equilibrium with equal prices
Conclusion
Outlines for National Models
Introduction
Static demand equations
Policies
Domestic price policy
Self-sufficiency targets, quota
Equilibrium with quota
Endogenous income distribution between
agricultural and non-agricultural sector
Freetrade
Domestic price policy
Solution for the demand equations
Equilibrium solution on the world market
-vii-
4.3
4. 3. 1
5.
6 .
6. 1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.
APPENDIX:
Quota
Domestic price equilibrium with quota
The assumptions in MOIRA
Some extensions
The budget constraint as an equilibrium condition
Intermediate demand and current supply adaptation
Producer and consumer tax/subsidy
More than one world market price
Stock mutations
Conclusion
Consumer's optimization tariffs and the theory of
duality
Bibliography
-viii-
LINKING NATIONAL MODELS OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE:
An Introduction
M. A. Keyzer
Part I: General Introduction
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 International interactions and the "Food and Agriculture " -
project at IIASA
Countries can interact in many ways: through trade;
capital flows, migration, diplomatic pressure, military
pressure, etc. The Food and Agriculture project will concen-
trate on the interactions through trade. Several approaches
are available to model these interactions. They ｭ ｾ ｹ be
classified in two groups.
I) Models in which international trade is studied for
its own sake.
II)
ad I)
Models in which international trade is merely a channel
through which national models interact.
In the first class we can distinguish between two
kinds of models:
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1.2 'Pure'Trade Models
Trade models concentrate on the trade matrix y try to
analyze its struc·ture and generate trade matrices in time, given
time series for the rowand/or column sums. The structure is
analyzed by comparing some (theoretically) inormal' flow with
the actual flow between i and j and by computing some parameters
(Delta coefficients) which are an indicator of the 'special'
nature of the flow. (R.A.S.-technique, Delta coefficients) [3].
In this way one can try to forecast the matrix given the row
and column sums.
1.3 Econometric Trade Models
These models (e.g. gravitational models [3]) explain the
trade between i and j from the circumstances in i and j respec-
tively and from some distance concepts between i and j. The
advantage is that some causal explanation is introduced. Some
disadvantages are that the econometric specification of the
disturbance term is very difficulty that the time series are
often quite short and that some information is lost in estimation
through the unexplained component.
Approaches 1.2 and 1.3 have in common ·that they do not try
to link country models--they only generate trade matrices, given
certain information about the specific country and given the row and
column sums of the trade matrices. The approach is, of course, not
fundamentally incompatible with the linking of na·tional models
(see Bottomley [3]).
ad II) The IIASA project clearly is more oriented towards the
second approach.
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This approach may be realized in a more or less fOrmal way.
1.4 Formal linking
What matters here is consistency. The imports of a
national model can, for example, be (indirectly) dependent on
exports. This can, on a world level, lead to a certain in-
consistency between total imports and exports. Some accommo-
dating principle then has to be introduced. One could adapt
exports to imports according to some specified rule. This
would imply a change in imports through adaptation of the
national models. This example makes it clear that formal
li.nking implies an iterative procedure which shohld con-
verge to an equilibrium, where there are no longer inconsist-
encies. It considers a closed system so that ｴ ｨ ｾ outside world
cannot perform a slack function thus accommodating for inconsist-
encies between decisions made within the model. Full equilibrium
is aimed at. The national models are considered as being one
simultaneous set of equations. The reason for this simultaneity
is that the models which have found empirical ｡ ｾ ｰ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ are
formulated in discrete time with a rather long time-step (e.g. one
year). It is very difficult to formulate a theOry of trade flows
in recursive terms, even with a shorter time period, so that
the simultaneous approach will be the most common one. An advantage
of this approach is that it makes it possible to take advantage
of the theory of general economic equilibrium, thus giving some
theoretical foundation to an approach otherwise ensuring only
consistency. This will be discussed extensively in the following
paragraphs.
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The solution of the simultaneous set of nonlinear equations
with inequality constraints will be quite complex, and possibly
non-unique and unstable.
One can look for simplifications within the formal linking approach
(e.g. through partial linearisation) but one can also abandon the
equilibrium approach by opening up the system.
1.5 Non-formal linking
This approach introduces a set of slack variables (in general
stock mutations or the net supply of an outside actor (country».
The exogenous variables of the national models (for which an
equilibrium value was computed in the formal linking approach)
adapt in a lagged way to the 'pressures v • In the mos-t simple
approaches cross price effects are disregarded. This approach is
quite popular because of its computational simplicity. It has
however some drawbacks:
1) If one assumes a high absorption capacity of an outside actor
(country), why was this actor's (country's) behaviour not con-
sidered within the model?
2} If one assumes that the slack function is performed by stocks
this role is limited by a nonnegativity constraint;
3) The assumption of a lagged response (in prices) seems in-
compatible with assumptions of perfect competition. Under
perfect competition no price adjustment would be needed once
a quantity adjustment has taken place.
The drawback can be avoided if the response is not lagged.
Then the approach may be considered as being identical with
a formal linking approach, in which the equilibrium search-
ing algorithm stops after a few iterations, while the
- 5 -
remaining inconsistencies are met by slack variables. Of course
all the problems mentioned under 1.4 then come up again.
It is not stated here that non-formal linking is never accept-
able. Formal linking may be absolutely impossible or theoretical
\
arguments for a non-formal linking procedure may exist.
One can, for example, incorporate the behavioural assumption that
producers raise their prices in relation to a decrease in their
stocks but this is a descriptive assumption about imperfect com-
petition which should not be build in as a technicality. The
conclusion must be that it is a matter of description of the real
world to decide how the national models should react upon their
outside world--that is, upon the other countries. Given those
models, the consistency at time t must be reaGhed as in a closed
system.
1.6 Loose linking
The ｦ ｯ ｲ ｭ ｾ ｬ linking approach may be too complex for certain
problems. In the 'loose linking' approach, models are run one
after the other in their original form given some time path for
exogenous variables. Tpe ,inconsistencies are computed each year
and a general proposal for a ｭｯｾ･ consistertt run is derived on
that basis. This sounds more like an emergency measure--in case
the formal linkage happens to fail--than a real alternative.
If the exogenous variables of the national models would
always follow some smooth trend then this procedure would be
practical, but this is not the case on the world food market!
The formal linking approach is pursued in the following
pages.
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2. Some notions of equilibrium
Before taking up the linking discussion again the meaning of some
notions of equilibrium will be clarified. This is required as some
people seem to fight the concept of equilibrium itself (e.g. J.Kornai:
Anti-equilibrium [2]) . A short survey of some notions will now be
presented.
2.1 Equilibrium condition
When a given description has taken the form of a model then any
restriction applied to this model can be called an equilibrium
condition: an equilibrium condition is a restriction which
selects a certain subset of the feasible set determined by a
model.
As this condition is not based on direct description of reality it is
occasionally called a non-primitive assumption (see Bliss (2».
It is clear from the definition that, once an equilibrium con-
dition is assumed to hold, the fulfillment of it is just a matter
of formal consistency of the model. If the model was already
fully determined, the addition of the extra restriction will, in
general, make the model overdetermined so that the equilibrium
condition cannot be fulfilled. If the original model happened
to have one degree of freedom left, then as soon as one assumes
that it holds the equilibrium condition simply becomes an equation
like any other. One can also derive from the definition
that any model which solves (uniquely) for all variables can in
several ways be considered as the equilibrium solution of a more
general model. To say it differently: a model of full dis-
equilibrium cannot exist (neither does a fully dynamic model,
cf.MOlRA, ch. III, [4]).
B.
2.2
A.
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There are only models in which specific equilibrium restric-
tions which existed in previous models have been relaxed. In the
following some of these ｳ ｰ ･ ｣ ｩ ｦ ｾ ｣ restrictions will be defined.
One should ｾ ･ ･ ｰ in mind that in economic literature no
strict agreement exists on these definitions.
Market equilibrium
There is market equilibrium in a static sense when demand
for every commodity does not exceed supply, i.e. when
the actions of the different decision makers are compatible.
There is market equilibrium in a dynamic sense when the
price expectations are realized.
2.3 Competitive (market) equilibrium
There is a competitive equilibrium in an economy if there is a
market equilibrium and if, while producers maximize profits and
consumers maximize utility--subject to the wealth constraiht--
both accept prices as given.
3. Models of general equilibrium
We are now in a position to discuss general equilibrium models.
We shall, not describe these models but only list some character-
istics of the general equilibrium (G.E.) models, as developed
by Arrow, Debreu and others[2]. The original G.E. models describe
competitive market equilibrium and have the following character-
istics:
a. the models consider an arbitrary given number of commodities,
producers and consumers;
b. factor services are treated as commodities, while the factor
endowments of consumers and the distribution of profits
among consumers are exogenously determined.
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c. all consumers and producers take the prevailing prices
as given;
d. all commodities and factor services can be traded (without
transportation costs);
e. some restrictions on producer technology and consumer
preferences are introduced.
The main interest of G.E. Models is to show that prices
exist which bring about full compatibility between the
decisions of all actors.
We can, of course, locate producers (and/or consumers) in
space, thus getting a multiregional or a multicountry model.
We may also locate commodities in time, thus introducing an
intertemporal aspect (thus introducing capital theory, e.g.
investment, credits and debts, into the model) .
As all actors take the existing prices as given, it is also
easy to introduce distortions, e.g. through producers and/or
consumers taxes and subsidies. (The net return from this policy
must then be treated as profits and be exogenously redistributed
over consumers.) Then the same commodity still has the same
producer price in all places--and the same consumer price
in all places.
If we introduce tariffs and subsidies on trade, we get
different prices between regions (or between consumer, i.e.
producer groups).
The tariffs may be discriminating (dependent on origin and
destination of the trade flow), the result of this is that
one gets different prices for the same commodity. One may
introduce transportation costs and untradable resources, thus
specializing in spatial economics or in international economics.
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4. Linking in a model of competitive general equilibrium:
With the application of general equilibrium theory to the theory
of international trade we are finally back to the matter of
linking national models. An application will be presented in
part II of this paper. The previous paragraph has hopefully
made clear that the G.E. framework offers a theory for the
linkage of national models. In a G.E. model all producers and
consumers are linked together through the market. Governments
can build up trade barriers between the nations but essentially
all actors are connected to each other. Thus,the world market
is not a submodel which shows the interactions between the
national models. It is the addition of a world market equilibrium
condition to the submodels of consumers and producers in the
different nations which yields the world model. That world
model is a model in which competitive equilibrium exists in .so
far as it exists both on the world market and on the domestic
markets. Thus it is not sufficient to require that the national
models should at every (world market) time-step, for any given
vector of world market prices 1 ), yield a vector of excess demand:
at least if one wants to formulate a general equilibrium model.
If one only puts that requirement on the national models one
considers them as black-boxes, so that approach will be called
the black-box approach.
One limitation of the black-box approach is that it does
not guarantee the existence let alone the uniqueness or the
ｾ ｨ ｩ ｳ formulation assumes the existence of one world market price.
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stability of any equilibrium price vector as nothing is required
about the form of the excess demand functions.
But it is obvious on the other hand that the fully
competitive G.E. model is not suitable for the IIASA-project
because it cannot represent centrally planned economies.
5. The formal linking of black-boxes:
The most simple interpretation of the black-box approach is
to assume that governments or traders of all countries "sit
around the table" and negotiate with each other until no excess
demand exists, that is until equilibrium is reached in the same
way as consumers and producers do in a G.E. representation. The
simultaneous character of the G.E. solution is preserved. There
are however some problems:
1) as mentioned above the existence of an equilibrium is not
guaranteed;
2) when the domestic market of a certain country is assumed to
be competitive and no sufficient information is available on
stock mutations (which is quite often the case) one is forced
back to a G.E. model for that country;
The main line of defence of ｴ ｨ ･ ｢ ｾ ｣ ｫ Ｍ ｢ ｯ ｸ approach for international
interactions is that the reliability of the response of excess
demand to price changes on the world market is all that matters.
This statement is open to certain objections:
a) The statement is not at all operational: all the problems
are hidden within the black-boxes;
b) Although it is not unreasonable to maintain that one needs good
national models to get a good world model, the reliability
of the national response functions is not a sufficient
- 11 -
econometrical condition for a good world model. The world
market prices are exogenous variables for the national
models;they are however endogenous in the world model.
This implies that the ", best' specification and parameter
estimates for the world model are not necessarily the best
ones of the national models.
It will of course be very difficult to solve all identifi-
cation problems and to estimate all equations of the world
model simultaneously, so the point may seem somewhat theo-
retical, but it shows that one cannot neglect the inside of
the black-boxes altogether.
Before turning to this intricate matter, the requirements
which already follow from the formal linking of black boxes
will be listed; they will be called external requirements
for the national models.
6. External requirements for national models
1) All models must react on world market prides of the
commodities as they are classified on the world 'market;
2) The set of countries and commodities must form a closed
system, so that the simultaneous character of inter-
actions is preserved;
3) All national models must be dynamic;
4) All national models must be descriptive and validated as
much as possible (reliability!).
7. Some internal reg:uirements for the black boxes
The concept of reliability is very hard to operationalize in
any formal way before the models have been developed. In the
following,two questions which came up at a taskforce meeting in
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July will be discussed. This will illustrate the fact that
internal requirements for the national models are needed;
I. Is it possible to have a finer commodity classification
within a national model than on the world market?
II. Is it possible to have a shorter time-step in a country
than on the -world market?
It dlrectly follows from the external requirements that a
rougher commodity classification or a longer time-step is not
acceptable. How about the opposite situation?
Both questions are quite similar. One commodity at different
points in time may be considered as different commodities at the
same point in time.
If a price equilibrium is assumed to exist on the world
market, all commodities within one class at all points in time
within one period are supposed to be traded at the same
equilibrium price.
a) If one makes a finer classification within a country or
uses a shorter time-step one needs to know the disaggregated
domestic prices (Pi't or Pit)·
J T
b) The class can be considered as a homogenous commodity on
the world market only as long as the different commodities
within it have the same price.
So,if requirement a) is fulfilled, the conditions which gUarantee
b) answer simultaneously questions I and II. It may already be
stated here that the answers will be ,affirmative but that the
conditions will be quite severe. Before we discuss this matter,
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some general conditions for the existence of equilibrium between
the 'black boxes' have to be listed. After that some limitations
will be mentioned and (cf. § 7.2) the question whether an equi-
librium with eoual prices exists will be studied.
7.1 Existence of equilibrium between black boxes:
Assumption 1: To any price vector p corresponds, a unique
number ｺ ｩ Ｈ ｰ Ｉ Ｑ ｾ ｣ ｡ ｬ ｬ ･ ､ the aggreqate excess
demand function for commodity i and so a unique
vector of aggregate excess demand functions Z(p).
Assumption 2: Z(p) = Z(kp) for all p>O and k>O
Assumption 3: p Z(p) = 0 (Walras' Law)
Assumption 4: Z(p) continuous 2 ) over its domain of
a)
definition S ;
n
Sn = {p I l:Pi = 1, P ｾ 0 }
S is by its definition a compact convex set.
n
b) We can define T(p), a continous mapping of S into itself. 3 )
n
Where T(p) p+M(p)
- [p+M(p)].e where e is the vector: [j]
order
As the
in-
point
M. (p) is continuous1.
and M. (p) > 0 if and only if z. (p) > 01. 1.
M. (p) = 9 if z. (p) = 01. 1.
p, + M. (p) > 01. 1. -
Note that nothing is assumed about the sign of partial derivatives
of z. (p) •1.
1) This restriction is quite severe and not ｮ ･ ｣ ｾ ｳ ｳ ｡ ｾ ｹ Ｚ If it can
be satisfied, the linking is however greatly sl.mpll.f1.ed.
2) Th' ｾ Ｎ t' 1.'S also severe It usually is weakened in1.S ｲ･ｳｾｲＱＮ｣ l.on • .
to allow for an infinite excess demand when the price 1.S zero.
proofs do not change essentially.but.only become ｳ ｯ ｭ ･ ｷ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｾ ｯ ｲ ･
volved (i.e. by applying Kakutanl.'s ｬ Ｎ ｮ ｾ ｴ ･ ｡ ､ of Brouwer s f1.xed
theorem), we shall keep to 4 for exposl.tory purposes.
3) cf. Arrow and Hahn [2].
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c) Using a) and b) we may by Brouwer's fixed point theorem
h . * * *state t at there 1S some p for which p = T(p ). The
construction of Mi(p) in turn implies that Z(p) ｾ o.
Note that assumptions 1-4 are internal requirements for the
black boxes. The proof presented here will be repeatedly re-
ferred to in the following pages.
Stock mutations
As mentioned before an equilibrium condition is a non-primitive
assumption. When we use a G.E. model to describe the world food
scene, \le assume that the condition of market equilibrium is a
realistic one. Note that from the market equilibrium condition
* .z(p ) ｾ 0 together w1th the so called "Walras Law" pZ(p) = 0
it follows that in equilibrium a commodity which is in
excess supply will have a zero price and that no commodities
are in excess demand; stock mutations of positively
priced commodities do not arise. This is clearly not always
reali.stic as stocks may well perform an adjustment function
and necessarily do so if no price equilibrium would exist other-
wise. The stock mutations mentioned here are undesired and
unforeseen by the actors. Desired stock mutations are of course
included in z(p).
Risk: This leads us to a conceptual problem. General equilibrium
models are deterministic. They can be so as they assume perfect
foresight of prices. If undesired stock mutations exist there
is clearly no perfect foresight. But even without these mutations
the assumption of perfect foresight is somewhat strange in a non-
stationary state. Uncertainty will always be present especially
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in the ｩ ｮ ｴ ･ ｾ ｲ ･ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ between 'black-box' nations. This should
-
be taken into account in the formulation of ｴ ｨ ｾ national models.
Oligopoly
The decisions of large nations more strongly influence the world
market price than those of small nations and the nations may be
aware of this when determining their agricultural policies.
This should also be reflected within the national models. The
world market may then become a market of monopolistic competition.
Though this need not influence the computation of prices, as the
problem of market equilibrium remains, the conditions for
･ ｸ ｩ ｳ ｴ ･ ｾ ｣ ･ and especially for stability of the equilibrium will
be different than under perfect competition. (See some
remarks on oligopolistic equilibrium, IIASA internal paper.)
7.2 Equilibrium with equal prices
We now want. to derive conditions under which two prices, say
P1 and P2' will always be equal in equilibrium, independently
from variations in their excess demands 2 1 , 22 . As long as
this is the case, commodities 1 ｡ｮｾ 2 may be considered as
fully substitutable when they are traded between countries.
This implies,at least in a competitive economY,that a
certain degree of indifference on the consumer's side and/or
on the side of producers must exist, because equal prices
imply unit slopes for isoquants or for isoutility functions.
To formulate it more precisely:
On the producers side the indifference can only be realized if,
1) the commodities can,at zero cost, be transformed into each
*other after production.
* When considering more time-steps, transformation through
stock formation is possible but only in one direction!
net demand vectors for all other commodities in
- 16 -
2) a) The commodities are fully substitutable as inter-
mediate inputs.
b) There is no lag in production and both products are
produced in identical production processes.
3) On the consumer's side the indifference implies that the
ratio of marginal utilities is one, for all positive values
of the consumption of both commodities.
If we only look at excess demand functions, we need not be
specific on the source of indifference.
Define:
z1' z2 net demand for commodity 1, 2 in country group A
z3 net demand vector for all other commodities in country
group A
* *z1' z2 net demand for commodities 1, 2 in country group B
*z3
country group B.
Case 1: Country group A has a full indifference (substitut-
ability) of the first type between commodity 1 and 2.
Consider now the condition of a non-positive excess demand
vector on the world market for commodities 0,3.
* *
--7 20 = z + z1 + z2 < 00 ｾ
*Z = z3 + z3 < 03 ｾ
On the basis of the proof given in § 7.1 one may state that
an equilibrium price vector will exist. Assuming that this
vector has a nonzero price for z and that the possible equilibria
o
are distinct, then the only requirement which still needs to be
met is:
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*z1 + z1 ｾ 0
*z2 + z2 < 0
/
I
which may be written as
*z1 + z1 < 0
*Zo - z1 + z2 ｾ 0
* *z2 + Zo ｾ z1 < z1
Clearly in equilibrium at a positive price we may write:
*z, = -z, =
so that this condition can be met as long as z1' z2 are not
restricted.
Case 2: Restrictions on z1 and z2
If the substitutability is not of type 1 then there are con-
straints on z1 and z2"
We define:
z _ x - y
000
x -2
Where x stands for demand and y for supply" For any given
equilibrium price vector with P1 = P2' the variables
* *z1' z2 and zo are known to be uniquely determined and
to add up to zero.
Moreover for equilibrium on the markets of commodity
1 and 2 it is required that
*z1 = -z 1
*z2 = zo + z1
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These equalities can always hold as long as z1' z2 are not
restricted. In the present case the following restrictions
must also be satisfied (bars indicate that the variable has
a given equilibrium value) .
Case 2.1 Consumers and producers (in country group A) are
indifferent (type 2 and 3)
In this case the total consumption and the total production
is given so that the total excess demand is restricted as the
country cannot export more than it produces or import more
than it consumes of the aggregate commodity:
< X
o
Case 2.2 Only producers are indifferent
-
y < z2 < X20 - =
Case 2.3 Only consumers are indifferent
- Y1 < z1 < X
- - 0
- Y2 < z2 < X
= - 0
In the cases described here the size of the country group A
is very important. A small country group A is very unlikely to
be able to accommodate for the excess demand of country group B.
It has thus been shown that under certain conditions an
equilibrium with equal prices can exist. The uniqueness, stabil-
ity of that equilibrium was not discussed. Neither was it stated
- 19 -
ｷｨｾｴｨ･ｲ｡ｮ equilibrium with unequal prices would also exist under
the given circumstances. But clearly if no restrictions are im-
posed on 2 1 , 2 2 and if within group A there is one country with a
competitive market economy then no equilibrium can exist at un-
equal prices (e.g. P1 > P2) as this would lead to 2 1 -----j + 00 and
2 2 ｾ - 00
8. Conclusion
The requirements presented above are quite severe and it seems
highly advisable to keep a common commodity classification and
,
a common time step for all countries.
It is not stated that it is always unrealistic to introduce
differences in time step. It seems for example quite clear that
the supply for agricultural non-animal products forms a rather
discrete process while demand and supply of animal products is
more of a continuous type. This poses interesting dynamical
problems of stockholding and price formation in terms of difference-
differential equation comparable to those of Kalecki's model of the
trade cycle (see Allen, Math. economics, p. 242). However it is
well known that general equilibrium theory becomes quite unrealistic
when one takes a very short time step.
Some further requirements can be derived (e.g. with regard to
the stability of world market equilibrium) but it is of course im-
possible to derive a full list which would guarantee the reliability
of the national models.
Every new requirement introduces one more feature which all
the national models must have in common. However the absence of
a full list of requirements does not allow the conclusion that the
wider the variety is in the structure of country models, the better
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the world model will be. Though an impression of richness and
realism may be conveyed by it, it is rather a sign of weakness
as differentiation between structures is only needed when the
various phenomena cannot be explained in terms of one theory,
with the different values of variables reflecting the variety.
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Part II: Outlines for national models
1. Introduction
The second part of the paper presents outlines for a
model of a country with a market economy'. This can be con-
sidered as an extension of the MOIRA-model in the following
respects:
1. n commodities will be considered instead of 1;
2. Apart from a policy which fixes domestic prices, a policy
which limits the balance of trade in the various commodities
will be introduced;
3. the non-agricultural sector and the relations between
agricultural and non-agricultural sector will be treated
more explicitly.
At all stages, existence of a market ･ ｱ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｢ ｲ ｩ ｵ ｭ will be
investigated. The net supply of food from the agricultural
sector is predetermined in MOIRA, so that changes in demand
(and stocks) are the only adjustment mechanisms on the world
market. We shall maintain this assumption here and even
disregard stock mutations. This implies that in equilibrium
all supply has to equal demand through an adjustment in demand
induced by price changes: Hence, special attention is re-
quired for the demand equations.
2. Static demand equations:
As more commodities are now involved, a theoretically
justifiable set of demand equations has to be set up. The
neoclassical demand theory seems to yield a fruitful starting
point.
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The following assumptions are made:
2.1 All prices are equilibrium prices except when stated
otherwise.
2.2 All commodities considered are final products.
2.3 All commodities are consumed in positive amounts.
2.4 We disregard the inequality of income distribution.
Each of these assumptions will have to be relaxed later
on, but for the moment the problem considered is:
where
S. T. L:p.x. = M
1 1
X.
1
p.
1
. d f .th d' /= quantlty consume 0 the 1 commo lty caput
. f h .th d'= prlce 0 tel commo lty
M = monetary income (to be fully spent on consumption)/caput.
The non-agricultural product is represented as ·the nth commodity.
The utility function is assumed to be continuous, concave and to
have continuous first and second derivatives. The first derivative
is assumed to be positive.
The first order conditions (F.O.e.) are:
3u
=dX.
1
),p.
1
LP'X' = M1 1
From this one can derive some well-known restrictions.
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( 1 ) Homogeneity I e .. + eiM = 01J
(2 ) Engel aggregation I w. e iM = 11
( 3) Cournot aggregation 2. w. e .. = -w.1 1J J
(4 ) Slutsky condition e .. = e .. (w./w.) + w. (e.M-e. M)J1 1J 1 J 1 1 J
(5) Substitution restriction e .. < 0
11
(uncomp. subst.)
(6) Logical restriction
where
e .. + w. e
1
' M < 0 (comp. subst.)11 1
I w. = 1
i 1
e ..
1J
ax. p.
= 1 J
ap. :x-:-
J 1
ax.
1
e iM = aM
If we consider the F.O.C. we find that the demand functions should
be obtained by solving for the quantities in terms of prices and
income. As this solution may be quite complex the econometrical
estimation of the parameters of the utility function may be
difficult. It will be shown in Appendix I that more
convenient approaches are available which make use of the possible
linear homogeneity of the utility function and of the tact that we
are really only interested in the parameters of the demand functions
which have to be such that the above mentioned reauirements are
satisfied.
The demand model may be thought of as being applicable to the
nation as a whole, where all consumers have the same taste and
the same income.
- 24 -
- assuming such a model for all nations,
taking the supply (Y) of all commodities as given,
- assuming no trade barriers or transportation costs,
- assuming that the incomes of all nations are measured in a
common unit and equal to the value of the supply, then
an equilibrium world market price exists. The proof of this
statement proceeds exactly along the same lines as the one given
in § 7 of part I.
3. Policies
3.1 Domestic price policy
The government of the country may want to fix domestic
prices. As a result of this a difference will occur between
world market prices (pw) and domestic prices (p). This price
difference accrues to the country or has to be paid by it;
from now on vector notation will be used. The budget equation
becomes:
px = (pw_ p ) (y-x) + M
with M = py
w wClearly this is equivalent with p x = p y, implying that under
the given assumptions (equal income distribution within the
nation, given supply) the domestic price policy has no effect
on demand, because we have assumed here that the consumer knows
the definition of the tariff receipts. Otherwise there would
be sensitivity to domestic prices. It will be shown later that
it is precisely on the supply and on the income distribution
that the domestic price policy has an effect.
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3.2 Self-sufficiency targets, quota:
Self-sufficiency targets may be formulated as
L < Y - x < R
where L, R are target vectors.
Normally the targets will be such':':lat
L < 0
R > 0
(maximum net import)
(maximum net export)
The selfsufficiency targets may be realized through the im-
position of quota on international trade. A tariff on inter-
national trade only generates a difference between domestic
and world market prices. Under the present assumptions, it
does not influence demand so that self-sufficiency targets can-
not be realized. 1 )
If the restrictions are ineffective one is back to the model
of the previous paragraph. If, however, a restriction is effective
the domestic consumption of a commodity is given by the constraint.
3.3 Equilibrium with quota
The introduction of quota sets bounds on the excess demand
functions. This restriction may however be inconsistent with
Walras' Law.
If
but wp (y-x) = 0
both requirements are inconsistent
as pw +0 • 2)
1)Even when the tariff receipts are not a side condition of the
utility ｭ ｡ ｸ ｩ ｭ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ tariffs are not a very adequate means for
realizing selfsufficiency targets. This can be seen, if one
writes out the first order conditions.
ｾ ｯ ｮ ｴ ｨ ･ international level EL c < 0 and ERc > 0 must be satis-
fied (c is the country index)
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The constraints have to satisfy at the national level the
restriction pWL < 0, pWR ｾ O. This is clearly the case if,
for example: L < 0, R > O.
4. Endogenous income distribution between the agricultural
and non-agricultural sector: generalforrnulation
Up to this point only the consumer has been considered in each
country. This was based on the assumption of a completely equal
income distribution. We now relax this assumption and consider
m income classes and n products: ·The agricultural sector
produces n-1 final products and the non-agricultural sector
thproduces the n product, which is also a final product. There
are no intermediate commodities. The model is thus a model of
a pure exchange economy.
The income of every income class is equal to the value of
the output.
Income is equally distributed within income classes.
4. 1 Free trade
The demand model under free trade now becomes
max u
j (x j )
S.T. wx j pWy jp =
4.2 Domestic price policy
The introduction of a difference between the domestic and
world market price causes a complication, as to how the revenue
from this difference has to be distributed over income groups.
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The budget equations may, in a general way, be written as
where a, is a distribution variable: 0 < a. < 1, Ea. = 1J - J - J
Clearly this distribution variable must be such that:
It will be assumed in this paper that this requirement is ful-
filled and a. will be treated as parameter. A more formal
J
treatment will be presented in a separate paper.
4.2.1 Solution for the demand equations
The excess demand functions now result from the
simultaneous solution of the several utility maximization
problems:
max u
j (x j )
S.T. px j = a.TR + pyj
J
Given TR a unique x j is determined. Clearly x j is a
continuous function of TR.
From the summation of the budget constraints, we get
px = TR + py
Is there an equilibrium value of TR such that
TR* = w(p -p) (y-x) ?
As can be seen from substitution, the problem 1S equivalent to
the question whether
pW(y _ x(TR» = 0 has a solution, TR*.
From the budget equation we know that px does not reach any
saturation level as TR increases for any value of p.
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If we assume that
then we know that
w 0ｾ >
dTR
lim w + <XlP X =
1
TR <Xl
I . w 01m p x =
ITR py
So we may conclude that the set of demand equations has a unique
solution under the given assumption.
4.2.2 Equilibrium solution on the world market
On the national level Walras' Law still holds as can be
seen from the summation of the budget equations.
The imposition of a tariff has an Bffect on income distribution
and by that, an effect on demand. It may also have a long run
effect on production but this is pot relevant under the present
assumptions.
The imposition of a tariff does not however introduce any dis-
continuity in the excess demand function, so that an equilibrium
still can be shown to exist on the world market.
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4.3 Quota
4.3.1 Domestic price equilibrium with q\1ota
When a constraint on international trade becomes
effective, say for the i th commodity, then its tolal domestic
consumption is given.
ｈ ｯ ｷ ･ ｶ ｾ ｲ Ｌ by the same token its domestic price becomes
variable because the world market price (minus possible tariffs)
becomes irrelevant for determining domestic prices. This is
so because arbitrage in that commodity becomes Ａ ｾ ｰ ｯ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･ Ｎ
We thus get the equations:
ｾ Ｎ (y. - x. - L.) = 0]. -J. ]. ].
v. (y. - x. - R.) = 0].]. ]. ].
p. = p. + ｾＮ - v.]. ]. ]. ].
L. < (y. - x.) < R.]. = ]. ]. = ].
i == 1, •.. ,n
Where Pi is the desired domestic price and Pi ｴ ｨ ｾ ､ ｯ ｭ ･ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｣
price realized in equilibrium. "The national model is obtained
by adding this set of equations to the previously derived
behavioural model.
Is it now possible for any given set of world market
prices to calculate domestic consumption and domestic equilibrium
prices? This will be investigated formally in a separate paper.
We now only ｾ ｵ ｰ ･ ｲ ｦ ｩ ｣ ｩ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ glance at the problem.
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1 ) p(xj-yj) =a. (pw-p) (y-x)
J
2) au
j
= A. p.ｾ J 1.x.
J
3) ｾ Ｎ (y. x. L. ) = 0
1. 1. 1. 1.
4) vi(Yi - x. - R. ) = 01. 1.
5) L· < y. - x. < R·1. - 1. 1. - 1.
6) p. = p. + ｾＮ - v.1. 1. 1. 1.
7) w x. ) 0Ep. (y. - =
1. 1. 1.
i=1, ... ,n
We define:
for given values of pW and p,the national excess demand
equation may be written as
z = Z (p) where p = ＨｾＬ - v)
now define
q = ＨｾｾＩ
ｾ Z ＨｐＩＫｾ
= Z (p) -
Thus, q = q(p)
The quota restrictions imply q < 0 (
and the complementarity equations imply: p.q = 0)
The existence proof for domestic equilibrium is quite complex
for two reasons:
1) the excess demand functions q = q(p) are not homogeneous
to the degree zero in Pi
2) The complementary conditions P'q = 0 are not automatically
implied by the demand equations.
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For proving the existence of domestic equilibrium we must
formulate a more general model, which in equilibrium can be
shown to satisfy the complementarity conditions.
This will be done in a separate paper. This vresent model is
still indeterminate as the taxation policy (determination of
OJ) is not discussed.
Moreover, it needs some generalization as the export constraint
implies
x ｾ y-R
which might be inconsistent with nonnegative prices.
* Note that if no quota constraints are effective, the
domestic prices are p. and the demand equations imply by them-
1
selves balance of trade equilibrium so that (7) can be omitted.
(This by the way illustrates the fact that ｗ ｡ ｬ ｲ ｡ ｾ Ｇ Law - at the
national level - can be an equilibrium conditidn instead of an
identity even under barter trade.)
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A classical proof of the existence of equilibrium would show
wthat there exists a price vector w = [p ,P1.'" Pm]' (m is the
number of countries), such that all the markets are cleared.
Here we want to proceed by showing that for any pW, and under
the assumption that the national excess demands could be
satisfied, P1 ... Pm exist. If this equilibrium is unique and
if the excess demand functions are continuous in world market
prices, world market equilibrium can be proved to exist. The
existence of equilibrium will then be proved in a hierarchical
way. This will be useful when investigating algorithms for
computation.
5. The assumptions in MOIRA
1. No tariff receipts for the agricultural sector
In MOIRA the assumption was made that the non-agricultural
sector gets the tariff receipts because government and traders
are part of the non-agricultural sector and because in countries
where the agricultural sector is important, direct taxation
(subsidy) of the farmers is not usual practice. The income
distribution between the agricultural and non-agricultural
sector is in these countries mainly realized through the prices
which the farmer gets for his product. So if we disregard all
other taxes and only consider tariffs it is not unreasonable to
assume that on the one hand the non-agricultural sector earns
the price differential while on the other hand, agricultural
prices are set in order to reach a certain income parity ratio
between sectors so that an increase in tariff receipts is trans-
mitted (with a lag) to the agricultural sector through a rise
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in the domestic food price. In terms of our present model the
distribution parameter a j is set to zero in the agricultural
sector.
2. Only one agricultural commodity and one non-agricultural
commodity are considered.
3. The agricultural consumer own5 all the factors of production
in agriculture, so that he gets the total value added of the
sector as income. The same assumption is made for the non-agri-
cultural consumer.
4. The agricultural sector is assumed to produde its own food
separately so that its food consumption plarl is made up ｴ ｯ ｾ
gether with its food production plan with a one period lag.
Thus the net food supply to the non-agricultural sector is pre-
determined: aYf :; Yf - x f The subscript f indicates food,
nf non-food, hyperscript n indicates non-agricultural sector
and a the agricultural sector.
5. There is assumed to be no difference betweeh the world
market price and the domestic price of the non-food
commodity. The budget equations can noW be written as:
a) agricultural sector:
b) non-agricultural sector:
ad a) It directly follows that:
a Pf n
x
nf = Yfw
Pnf
ad b) This is equivalent to:
w w
Pf)Pf n
+
n
Ynf +
.{Pf - n
x f x =
. Yfw nf w
Pnf Pnf
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The non-agricultural commodity may now be taken as ｮ ｵ ｭ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｩ ｲ ･ Ｎ
wSo we set p = 1
nf
Summation of both equations yields
w n' a n w n
Pf x f + (xnf + xnf ) = Ynf + Pf Yf
z = 0 which means that Walras Law is satisfied onn
the country level.
The equilibrium can now be shown to exist in the same
way this was done before. ｈ ｯ ｷ ･ ｶ ･ ｾ it must again be stressed
that this equilibrium need not be unique, stable, or with
reasonable bounds for the price vector.
As a matter of fact in the MOIRA runs some limits were set on
price mutations. When no equilibrium could be found, a situation
of excess demand/supply was assumed to exist thus forcing the
countries to adapt domestic prices or to allow stock mutations.
These matters will not be discussed further, although deeper
investigation is needed in this field.
Ｖ ｾ Some extensions
6.1 The budget constraint as an equilibrium condition
Up to this point we worked with the static budget constraint
as if it was a structural equation of the model. It indeed pro-
vided us with a sufficient condition for Walras' Law.
This condition is however not necessary and it will in general
not be fulfilled in reality. It may be considered as an equi-
libriurn condition for the balance of trade. This conqition may
be replaced by a more general one which would allow for debts:
- 35 -
The most easy way would be to keep k j exogenous or at least
predetermined for all countries with the restriction that
Ek j =
j
would
o. this would avoid going into the pricing of debts which,
introduce many complications, such as future markets.
The approach sketched here could thus take into account dis-
equilibrium of the balance of trade, but it would still be an
equilibrium condition as far as it states that there is monetary
equilibrium. This provides some illustration of the statement
that every model has its equilibrium condition(s). Once we
assume that it holds this condition becomes a balance equation
which closes the system, so that a simultaneous approach
may become relevant.
As long as the budget constraint is the only constraint it
implies that money can buy anything, anywhere, as no limited con-
vertibility between the national currencies is introduced.
Important parts of the national income cannot, however, in
reality be traded internationally. This may be reflected by
the imposition of quota.
6.2 Intermediate demand and current supply adaptation
Although the introduction of intermediate demand and current
supply adaptation does not essentially change the framework
developed here, it causes serious complications of a
computational nature. The full consequences of the extension
will not be investigated here. A very general kind of neo-
classical model will be sketched and some specific assumptions
will be added.
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1. Neoclassical assumptions:
- producers are assumed to maximize net revenue at given
prices, within their technological constraints;
- consumers maximize utility given the prices and the
budget constraints.
2. Specific assumption:
Net sectoral revenue is distributed to the consumer
of the sector. This can be motivated by saying that if
one assumes that the sector owns all the factors then it
will also get the profit.
3. The equations are:
max.
S.T.
max.
S.T.
max.
S.T.
a)
b)
c)
agricultural consumer
non-agricultural consumer
agricultural producer
｛ ｖ ｙ ｾ ｦ ｦ ｝ £ Ta (agricultural technology)
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d) non-agricultural producer
max.
S.T. (non-agricultural technologt)
The price sensitivity of supply will not be discussed now. It
will however be intuitively clear that no fundamental changes
occur by the introduction of producer behaviour. 11oreover,
the international trade policy of tariffs, subsidies and quota
mainly introduces complications in consumer behaviour as long
as the producer is assumed to face domestic prices. Therefore
the matter will not be investigated further in this paper.
6.3 Producer and consumer tax/subsidy
There may be more than one domestic price: producers or
consumers may get a subsidy/tax.
!f producers pay a tax (i.e. get a subsidy) while there is a
tariff on international trade and the income class considered
qets a share a. of the total (taxesl and tariffs) the budget equation
J
becomes (assuming balance of trade equilibrium)
where pc is the consumer price and p the producer price.
If the consumer pays a tax/subsidy, the equation becomes:
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C J'p x =
c w c w w c(p -p)z + (p -p ) (y-x) = (p -ply - (p -p )x
c w w w c)(p -p)z + (p -p) (y-x) = (p -ply - (p -p x
So both formulations are fully equivalent.
Again on the national level,Walras' Law is satisfied so that no
specific complications arise.
One should notice, however, that the money amounts involved in
reaching a certain price differential will always be much lower
when one is using a tariff than when one is using a tax, and that
the distribution rule is again not investigated.
(Cf. "General equilibrium with taxes: a computational exercise
and an existence proof", Shoven, Whalley), [2] .
6.4 More than one world ｭ ｡ ｲ ｫ ･ ｴ ｰ ｲ ｩ ｣ ･ ｾ
The agricultural products which arc traded internationally can
in general be considered as perfectly homogeneous products in the
sense that the physical characteristics of the commodity are
not (strongly) dependent upon the country of origin. Therefore
arbitrage between markets is possible. So that the prices paid
internationally will tend to be equalized.
There are, however, some possible counteracting factors.
1) Transportation ｣ ｯ ｳ ｴ ｳ ｾ
This yields the so called Samuelson equilibrium conditions:
p. < p. + T ..
J 1. 1J
o .' [p. - (p. + T .. )] = 0
1) J 1. 1J
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where T .. is the cost of transporting one unit from region
1J
i to j and Q.. is the quantity transported ftom region i to j
1J
and p. is the price in region i.
1
2) Customs unions:
Some countries may organize free trade with each other but
may restrict trade with outside nations (by tariffs and quota) .
When import and export quota for certain commodities are set
at zero level, the case becomes equivalent to a situation
with prohibitive transportation costs. The problem with a
customs union is that one has to devise a rule for distri-
buting the tariff receipts.
3) Discriminating tariffs:
It is possible, in the same way as customs unions discrimi-
nate between members and non-members, that a country would
levy different quota or tariffs on trade flows depending on
or destination. Whether different world market prices will
arise depends on the indifference of other countries (see
part I, § 7).
6.5 Stock mutations:
We now introduce stock mutations and sketch the consequences
in the model of § 4.
Stocks can be owned at different levels.
1. Producer level:
Consequence: Adaptation of direct supply, m, such that the
new stock ｫ ｾ ｾ kf_1 + m satisfies 0 2 kf ｾ ka (ka is the storage
capacity). If the producer only stores 'as a producer' he only
ｳ ｴ ｯ ｾ ･ ｳ his own product qJ'/ thus m. < q.
J = J
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2. Consumer level:
The consumer may hold stocks of commodities he does not pro-
duce. The consequence of this is that he demands commodities for
two purposes: storage and consumption.
This must be reflected in his utility function. The commodities
which have been stored appear next year as a net supply so that
the consumer behaves 'as if' he was a producer.
3. National level:
The stock formation is done collectively by the government
so that the government has to pay it out of the budget.
Assuming that taxes and tariffs are distributed in the same way
the only change in the demand model is a redefinition of govern-
ment receipts (TR):
where l' is restricted by storage capacity kU
(Note that the definition may be extended for all kinds of govern-
ment consumption and investment.)
4. World level:
National governments pay to finance regional or world stocks:
I = I Dom• + IWorld
c c c
I World = L: IWorld
c c
with the budgetary consequences of 3.
- 41 -
7. Conclusion
In the present paper a framework has been developed for
modelling international trade policies in a country with com-
petitive domestic markets. It has been shown that the country
models may be linked through a competitive world market. How-
ever, a more formal treatment still has to be presented. The
supply side of the market economy was not depicted and govern-
ment policies have not yet been endogenized.
- 42 -
APPENDIX I
Consumer ｏ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｭ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ Tariffs and the Theory of Duality
A simple procedure will be presented here for solving demand
functions from a utility maximization. Consider
max. ｾ Ｈ ｸ Ｉ
S.T. px = M
, This yields as. F.O.C. :
dU i 1 , ••• , ndX. = vp· =1.
1.
px = M
This simultaneous set of equations may be very hard to solve
(and to estimate econometrically!). Consider, however, a linear
ｮ ｯ ｭ ｾ ｧ ･ ｮ ｯ ｵ ｳ utility function. From the F.O.C., we may derive
u = vM
v may be considered as the reverse of an aggregate price index
function. Maximization of u is equivalent to minimization of
1ｾ = r . So we consider a specified expenditure function instead:v
of a utility function. We can see that
.,
C - u
This is a very easy solution. It means that
( 1 )
x. = u •1.
(1)The functions v (p), ｾ Ｈ ｰ Ｉ must exist, be jointly continuous,
concave and nondecreasing in p and positively linear homogenous.
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which again implies that quantity proportions are:
X.
l.
X.
J
=
p.
l.
p.)
= ｾＩ au
ax:-
J
The expenditure function C = p(p)u is a special case of the form
known as the Gorman polar form.
C = p (p) • u + A (p)
where
A(p) is an expenditure which has to take place in any
case, independently from tne utility level reached.
Differentiating this function to Pi ｹ ｾ ･ ｬ ､ ｳ xi. If ｾ Ｈ ｰ Ｉ is a
Cobb-Douglas and A(p) a linear function, we are in the case of
the L.E.S. system.
We shall not discuss all the kinds of possible expenditure func-
tions which correspond to given utility functions as this is
done extensively in the papers by Keller and by Norman. What
we want to find out here, is whether and how instruments of
agricultural policies may be built into a "dual" formulation.
Case 1 -- Income Distribution
Each consumer class ｨ ｾ ｳ its own behaviour:
max. u (x.)
J
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For the individual consumer class the expenditure function is
again
C. = j..J(p) • u(x.)
J J
x.
1.
so that J may be derived from:
xh .
J
ac.
J
ap:
1
dj.l(p)
- dp.
1
u(x.) =
J
X.
1.
J
x.
dj.l(p)
1. ap.
thus _J 1=
Xh . dj.l(p)
J dPh
Now the simultaneous system becomes very simple. For every
consumer we have given proportions:
X.
1.
_J
xh .
J
= a.1.
J
i l, ... ,h, ... ,n
while the budget equations are:
L: p. x .. =
1 lJ
1
[M. +0.. ｌ Ｚ Ｈ ｰ ｾ Ｍ ｰ Ｎ Ｉ Y.] - a. L: ＨｐｾＭｐＮＩ L: x .. ).J J 1 1 1 J ill j lJ
This is clearly a linear set of equations which is very easy to
solve.
Case 3 Quota
This case is more complex. Here the quantity demanded is
given in some equations while the prices are not given. If the
quota are effective in all commodities the solution from the
primal F.O.C. is available. In mixed cases, however, no such
simple solution seems to be available.
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